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摘  要 
   本文遵循以钱颖一和 Weingast 为代表的财政分权研究传统，探讨中国特色财
政分权体制对地方政府的激励效应，分别从经济发展中的产业选择、由财政转移
支付中攫取政治租金、供给基本公共服务和维护生态环境四个方面来分析。 





































  The dissertation studies Chinese fiscal decentralization’s incentive effect on local 
government, respectively, I undertake the research involving industry chosen,  
political rents extracted from fiscal transfer, the supply of basic public service and the 
ecological environment maintenance.  
  Firstly, I describe the basic characteristics of fiscal decentralization system in China 
including income distribution system between local government and central 
government and the way of local government revenue collecting, and portray the 
fiscal and political incentives mechanism local governments faced by analyzing local 
government responsible for central government and local residents. 
  Secondly, I investigate the relation between local government incentive and 
manufacturing industry development. Under fiscal decentralization system with 
Chinese characteristics, revenue collecting and promotion incentive motivate local 
government to capture rural land to supply manufacturing industry at low cost, which 
have boosted manufacturing industry rapid growth. 
  Thirdly, I explore the relation between fiscal transfer and extracting political rent. 
Huge, complicated fiscal transfer system shoulders the responsibility of providing 
fiscal resources for local government’s supplying public service, but it’s so difficult to 
assess the fiscal transfer performance that lots of transfer is extracted by local 
government for their political rent.  
  Fourthly, I have finished the empirical analysis on fiscal decentralization leading to 
the shortage of basic public services. Under fiscal decentralization with Chinese 
characteristics, local governments would prefer those which can give birth to short 
term performance to basic public service supplying. I selected primary education and 
public health with higher degree of decentralization to test this guess.  
  Finally, I study the relation between fiscal decentralization and ecological 
environment maintenance. Fiscal decentralization with Chinese characteristics is not 
conducive to encourage local governments to maintain the ecological environment. 













mechanism for maintaining ecological environment with regional spillover. I put 
forward Chinese ecological compensatory fiscal transfer using ecological 
compensation experience in Brazil, India and Germany for reference. 
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 1.1.1 理论意义 

































































  本文的研究主要借鉴 Acemoglu， Johnson 与 Robinson（2005）的分析框架。
他们认为，制度和政策并非是最大化社会利益的结果，而是政治均衡的结果。由
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